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The Role of Japanese Local Governments in Stabilisation Policy * 
 
Werner PASCHA and Frank ROBASCHIK  
 
 
Abstract  
Local governments in Japan account for about 80 per cent of general government spending 
when excluding social security expenditures. Therefore, for the implementation of fiscal 
policy it is important how local governments will behave. 
On the basis of the economic theories on fiscal federalism it is generally rational for local 
government entities, especially smaller ones, not to participate in the stabilisation policy of 
the central government and to take a free rider position. Such a behaviour would imply a 
substantial reduction or even an offsetting of the effects of a stabilisation policy of the central 
government. As for empirical evidence, a procyclical behaviour of local entities was observed 
in several countries, among them Germany. We show that in Japan this was not the case and 
that so far local governments do participate in the stabilisation efforts of the central 
government. In a second step we show the institutional arrangements that have enabled the 
central government to influence the fiscal behaviour of the local governments accordingly. 
Will recent regulatory changes and the enourmous debt level have a significant impact? We 
argue that although from April 2000 some legal changes in the direction of decentralisation 
were enforced, many influence mechanisms remained intact and thus the changes weaken the 
established system, but did not break it up altogether. 
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local government borrowing, intergovernmental fiscal relations, Japan, federalism, fiscal 
equalisation, fiscal policy, government debt, local allocation tax, local autonomy, public 
finance, stabilisation policy. 
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1 Introduction 
There has been a lot of discussion to what extent the relations between central and local 
government in Japan are dominated by the central government. Most of the 
contributions take a political science approach. While one stream of authors is arguing 
that there is only little autonomy of local governments (e.g. Steiner 1965, most recently 
Ishi 2000), others have been arguing that there is quite substantial autonomy of local 
governments (e.g. Aqua 1980, Muramatsu 1997, Reed 1979, 1982, 1986, Samuels 1983). 
Doi (1998) states that Japanese local finance is managed jointly by the control of the 
central government and the request of the local governments.  
We try to take a fresh look at this issue by analysing a data set neglected so far: the 
responsiveness of regional government expenses to the (national) business cycle. The 
gist of the argument goes like this: it is ususally not in the interest of localities and 
regions to behave anti-cyclically. If, however, a considerable degree of pro-cyclical 
behaviour should be found, this can serve as a substantial evidence for influence from 
the central government, in whose interest it is to ensure countercyclicality of fiscal 
policy. 
Depending on which view on the autonomy of local governments is right, this has 
considerable implications for the possibility of proactive countercyclical policy in Japan, 
where about 80 per cent of general government spending (excluding social security 
expenditures) are effected on a sub-national level. Under current reform measures, if 
local governments become more independent, they will follow the central fiscal policy 
less than before and reduce the possibility of effective countercyclical policy. 
After giving an overview of the relevant literature on fiscal federalism, our major 
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question is whether the revenues and expenditures of the local governments are 
procyclical, which would indicate a free rider behaviour of the local governments, or 
countercyclical, which would indicate that the stabilisation policy of the central 
government can dominate the fiscal behaviour of the local governments and thus signals 
a strong influence of the central government on the regions. Afterwards, we ask about 
the institutional reasons for the financial behaviour of the local governments. Then we 
discuss the likely effects of recent changes and reforms on the relationship between 
central and local government in Japan and close with an overall assessment of the 
effects of the system. 
 
2 Literature review  
The issue of fiscal federalism has been discussed widely (e.g. Thiebout 1956, Buchanan 
1950, Oates 1972, Wellisch 1995, Feld/Kirchgässner 1998, Oates 1999). The major 
question is which level of government should be responsible for certain tasks. 
Following the analytical approach of Musgrave (1959), one can subdivide the tasks in 
question into allocation, distribution and stabilisation. In this paper, we concentrate on 
only one of these aspects - on stabilisation. 
 
2.1 The normative view 
While some case for a decentralised conduct of fiscal policy can be made (e.g. Gramlich 
1987: 310-311), the traditional normative view underlines the disadvantages (e.g. Oates 
1972: 21-30, Pommerehne 1977: 292). The main argument is the openness of small 
local entities. Even if, because of assymetrical shocks, a decentral conduct of fiscal 
policy would be desirable, it would be largely ineffective, because of large 
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inter-regional trade interdependence. This causes low expenditure multipliers within the 
region concerned and positive spillovers to other regions.1 Given the low expenditure 
multipliers it is rather questionable whether the expenses used for stabilisation purposes 
could be refinanced by increased tax revenues stemming from the results of the conduct 
of an active stabilisation policy. Therefore, at least in the short run, free rider attitudes 
can be expected to be dominant.  
Moreover, usually there is a central government monopoly of monetary policy. If 
stabilisation is financed by debt, there may be spillovers on interest rates of the whole 
currency area.  
Another traditional argument for a central conduct of fiscal policy, which is, however, 
becoming less important with the proceeding development of capital markets, is that it 
is usually more difficult for local governments to access debt finance. 
All in all, the normative literature suggests that stabilisation policy is primarily the task 
of the central government. An alternative would be a coordinated stabilisation policy of 
local governments, but it is difficult to achieve such a coordination. Coordination could 
be enhanced by central government guidelines, subsidies, provision of access to the 
capital market, etc. ensuring the coordination if necessary. Therefore, if there is 
empirical evidence that local governments actually do participate in stabilisation efforts, 
this suggests the presence of effective central government influence. 
 
                                                        
1 If, however, larger entities (e.g. US-states, EU-countries) engage in stabilisation policy, there is 
some possibility of success for an own conduct of fiscal policy since the spillovers are smaller. 
Especially for smaller entities, however, given considerable spillovers to other regions, an 
uncoordinated conduct of fiscal policy may have undesired results. 
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2.2 Empirical studies 
There have been quite a few studies on the question of whether the financial behaviour 
of local governments is procyclical or countercyclical (table 1). As for the United States, 
different conclusions are reached depending on the time period investigated and 
methodology used. In Germany, especially in the 1970s, there was an intensive 
discussion about how to avoid the adverse effects caused by the procyclical public 
investment activities of local governments, which were disturbing the attempts of the 
federal government at stabilisation.2 
 
Table 1  Results of empirical studies on the cyclical behaviour of local governments 
Author (Year) Country/Region Time period Result 
Hansen/Perloff (1944) United States 1930s Procyclical 
Rafuse (1965) United States 1945-61 Countercyclical in recessions 
Bundesbank (1972) Germany 1960s Municipal investment procyclical 
Snyder (1973) Six countries 1955-65 Different from country to country and 
partly depends on the concept used 
Kock (1975) Germany 1960s Municipal investment procyclical 
Gramlich (1978) New York 1955-74 Procyclical 
Park (1990) United States 1982-86 Countercyclical 
Von Hagen (1992) United States 1980-86 States: countercyclical effects of  
      unemployment insurance 
Source: Own compilation using Park 1990: 45-46. 
 
As for Japan, the available literature concentrated more on case studies of political 
issues between central and local governments and added insights that subsidies do not 
necessarily imply an unlimited degree of control over local finance (e.g. Reed 1986, 
Samuels 1983). On the other hand, a study on taxation issues concerning local 
                                                        
2 In addition to the general incentive for local governments not to participate in stabilisation policies, 
this tendency was further supported by the following: Generally, investment expenditures are more 
easily adjusted, while current expenditures are more inflexible. Given the existence of “deficit 
criteria” for municipalities decided by the states (Länder), using the surplus of the current account as 
the main criteria for the amount of allowed borrowing, municipalities, which account for the bulk of 
public investment in Germany, made their investments when there was a surplus in the current 
account. The situation for the states (Länder) was similar, only the extent of the countercyclical 
effects was smaller (Kock 1975: 23-29, similarly Vesper 1999: 182-83). 
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autonomy shows the interests of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MHA)3 to be important factors (Jinno/deWit 1996). 
Hayashi (1998, 1999, 2000) deals explicitly with the importance of local governments 
in stabilisation policy in Japan, arguing that the "American theories" of Musgrave and 
Oates that stabilisation policy should be done by the central government (alone) do not 
hold for Japan where central and local government finance are not separated so clearly 
and the weight of local finance is much higher. There are also studies on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations (Imai 1993) and studies on the sustainability of 
government debt, including local debt (Doi/Nakazoto 1998, Doi 2000) which offer 
some related insights. 
 
3 The importance of local government behaviour for stabilisation policy in Japan 
First, let us ask whether the fiscal role of local governments is actually significant in 
Japan. In an international comparison (table 2), the share of local governments in total 
government  expenditure  in  Germany,  Canada  and,  indeed,  Japan  are  particulary  high. 
This  is  true  both  of  consumption  and  investment  expenditure.  Therefore,  if  an  active 
 
Table 2  Share of local expenditure in total general government expenditure in 1997  
        (excluding social security expenses) in an international comparison 
Country Share of local expenditure in total expenditure 
Germany 82.3% 
Canada 81.4% 
Japan 79.3% 
United States 64.0% 
Italy 50.5% 
France 41.6% 
United Kingdom 37.0% 
Source: OECD, Data for Italy is of 1995, for the United Kingdom for 1996 
                                                        
3 In 2001 the MHA has become part of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and 
Telecommunications.  
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stabilisation policy is implemented, for these countries it is more important that local 
governments follow the direction of the central government policy than for the United 
Kingdom, France or Italy. 
Next, we ask to what extent observed differences in the behaviour of local governments 
actually have a significant impact. In table 3 we have prepared a simple simulation of 
government expenditures under different environments. Case one presents the situation 
during the strong stimulation of the economy by the Japanese government in fiscal year 
1998/99 as compared to 1997/98, when local governments did follow the central 
government's stimulative policy. While central government public works expenditure 
was raised by 22%, prefectures and localities followed suit, and overall expenditure rose  
 
Table 3  Simulation of annual changes of central and local government public works  
        expenditures 
 Assumptions   
Central government
(General Account) 
Prefectures/ 
states (Länder) 
Municipalities 
Total 
Public Work 
 Expenditure 1) 
Case 1  
(Japan 98/99) 
 
22.5% 
 
12.0% 
 
 2.4% 
 
13.0% 
Case 2 
(Germany 67/66) 
 
17.7% 
 
-6.5% 
 
-9.4% 
 
-4.4% 
Case 3 
(Japan 98/99 as if  
Germany 66/67) 
 
22.5% 
 
-6.5% 
 
-9.4% 
 
3.4% 
Note: 
1) The calculation for the total was made on the basis of the following formula: 
 Change for total expenditure =  
 = (share of central government expenditure*) x (1+change of central government expenditure) + 
 + share of prefectural expenditure*) x (1+change of prefectural expenditure) + 
 + share of municipal government expenditure*) x (1+change of municipal expenditure)) - 1 
   *) The shares of the different levels of government in total expenditure of the year before the  
     change were used in the simulation. 
 In this simulation we did not consider double-counting between the different levels of government,  
 since this is not important for demonstrating the potential of local governments to diminish the  
 effects of central government stabilisation policy. 
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by some 13%. Case two presents the case of Germany in 1967 in comparison to 1966, 
when local governments wrecked all the effects of the central governments' attempt of a 
countercyclical stabilisation policy. The 17.7% increase of federal government 
investment expenditure was transformed into a -4.4% in total. Case three is a 
combination of case one and case two and shows what would have happened in Japan in 
1998/99, if local governments had behaved like local governments in Germany in 1967. 
The simulation shows that in Japan also, local governments could have offset much of a 
central government effort for stabilisation. A meagre increase by 3.5% would have been 
effected, even if the central government had raised its expenditures by 22.5% as actually 
registered. 
 
4 Assessment of the cyclical behaviour of local governments in Japan. Are the  
  revenues and expenditures of the local governments pro- or countercyclical? 
The studies quoted in part two used different methods for assessing whether the 
behaviour of the local governemnts are pro- or countercyclical. We will use a simple 
method and look at the share of local government expenditures/revenues in GNP. A 
rising level of expenditures and a falling level of tax revenues in a recession and a 
falling level of expenditures and a rising level of tax revenues during a business peak 
indicate a stabilising role of local governments, i.e. countercyclical behaviour. 
Accordingly, a falling level of expenditures and a rising level of tax revenues in a 
recession and a rising level of expenditures and a falling level of tax revenues during 
peak conditions indicate a destabilising role of local governments, i.e. procyclical 
behaviour. 
We use the official dating of business cycles in Japan (Table 4). Although there are 
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some problems – for example the dating of October 1993 as the end of a recession – this 
has the advantage that it closely reflects the official and thus the political perception of 
business cycles. 
 
Table 4  Business Cycles in Japan since 1951 
Cyc-
les 
lower 
turning 
point 
upper 
turning 
point 
Upswing  
(months) 
Downturn 
(months) 
Length of  
cycle 
(months) 
Name 
1.  June 1951   4  Korea boom 
2.  Oct. 1951 Jan. 1954 27 10 37 Investment boom 
3.  Nov. 1954 June 1957 31 12 43 Jimmu boom 
4.  June 1958 Dec. 1961 42 10 52 Iwato boom 
5.  Oct. 1962 Oct. 1964 24 12 36 Olympics 
6.  Oct. 1965 July 1970 57 17 74 Izanagi boom 
7.  Dec. 1971 Nov. 1973 23 16 39 Archipelago rebuilding 
boom/First oil crisis 
8.  March 1975 Jan. 1977 22  9 31  
9.  Oct. 1977 Febr. 1980 28 36 64 Second oil crisis 
10.  Febr. 1983 June 1985 28 17 45 Yen shock 
11.  Nov. 1986 April 1991 51 32 83 Bubble economy/ 
Heisei recession 
12.  Oct. 1993 March 1997 41 25 66  
13 April 1999      
Note:  March 1997 and April 1999 are preliminary dates 
Source: http://www.epa.go.jp/2000/f/0619f-hiduke-2.html, accessed on 3 July 2000 
 
The data for revenues and expenditures of central and local governments is available 
only on a yearly basis, while the official dating of business cycles is done on a monthly 
basis. Therefore, we classify a year with at least six months of bad business conditions 
as a year of bad business conditions and a year with at least six months of good business 
conditions as a year of good business conditions.4 
According to table 5, the expenditures of local governments in Japan clearly rose and 
were thus countercyclical during recessions. There are two exceptions, namely the 
minor recessions of 1980-1983 and 1985-86, which were dominated by the efforts of the 
                                                        
4 Months with turning points were classified in neither category. 
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central government to reduce the deficit. In times of good business conditions, local 
government expenditures grew slowly when compared to the GNP (until 1969 and in 
1983/84), or at least more slowly than during times of recessions (with the exception of 
the bubble period). In the 1970s, there was a rising trend of local government 
expenditures even in years of good business conditions. The same tendencies can be 
observed also for public works expenditures of local governments. The negative figure 
for the total of the fiscal years 1997/98 and 1998/99 is the result of the decrease of 
public work expenditures despite a starting downturn in fiscal year 1997/98. This was a  
 
Table 5   Average annual growth rates of the share of local and central government  
         expenditure in GNP in Japan (in per cent) 
Fiscal 
Years 
Uspwing/
Downturn 
Local 
government 
expenditures 
Local government 
public works 
expenditures 
Central 
government 
expenditures 
Central government 
public works 
expenditures 
58-62 Upswing -1.2 5.6 -1.1 5.2 
1962/63 Downturn 9.1 14.0 12.0 15.7
1963-65 Upswing -1.3 2.6 -2.4 -2.7 
1965/66 Downturn 2.8 3.6 1.2 5.8
1966-70 Upswing -1.1 2.3 -0.9 -4.7 
1970-72 Downturn 7.8 10.2 4.1 10.2
1972-74 Upswing 2.0 -2.5 4.7 -2.4 
1974/75 Downturn 10.6 2.0 9.2 1.3
1975-77 Upswing 1.0 -5.0 1.7 1.3 
1977/78 Downturn 3.9 11.1 7.0 14.1
1978-80 Upswing 3.1 4.0 6.1 4.4 
1980-83 Downturn 0.1 -1.1 0.1 -2.3
1983-85 Upswing -2.9 -3.0 -1.3 -6.7 
1985-87 Downturn -1.1 0.8 -3.3 -5.6
1987-91 Upswing 0.8 2.5 -0.1 -6.4 
1991-94 Downturn 2.9 5.9 -0.1 21.8
1994-97 Upswing 0.1 -2.2 -0.4 -5.3 
1997-99 Downturn 1.2 -0.5 4.1 3.4
among it: 
1997/98 
 
Downturn 
 
-4.0 
 
-7.6 
 
-3.1 
 
-12.7
1998/99 Downturn 6.7 7.1 11.8 22.5
Notes: 1) The Japanese fiscal year starts in April and ends in March. For the central government,  
       general account data was used. 
      2) The average annual growth rates are derived by calculating the geometric mean of the  
        annual growth rates of the share the relevant expenditure in GNP for the period concerned. 
 10
time which was dominated by discussions about the necessity of fiscal discipline and a 
corresponding law adopted by the central government. The ensuing fiscal restraint could 
not be fully compensated by the increase in fiscal 1998/99 after the law was frozen. 
However, in both fiscal years local governments followed the central government in the 
movement of their expenditure. 
All in all, except for the second half of the 1980s, local government expenditure was 
countercyclical if one follows the official dating of business conditions in Japan. 
Next, we look at the correlation of local government and central government 
expenditure. Interestingly, they show similar cyclical movements during the period 
under consideration. The correlation between the growth rates of the shares in GNP of 
central and local government expenditures was 0.72 for the period from 1955 to 1998. 
 
Table 6  Correlation of growth rates of shares in GNP of central and local government  
        expenditure by time period and state of business conditions 
 All years of period Years of upswing Years of downturn 
1955-69 0.71 0.22 0.97
1970s 0.59 0.60 0.48
1980s 0.54 0.57 0.74
1990-98 0.62 -0.01 0.68
whole period 0.72 0.55 0.81
1970-98 0.69 0.60 0.76
Note: 1) For the central government, general account data was used. 
 
When we look at the cyclical behaviour of public works expenditures of the general 
account of the central government and of the local governments, we observe that local 
governments followed the central government in increasing public works expenditure in 
recession years (again with the exception of the recession 1980-83, but this exception 
holds for both central and local governments), but they did not always follow decreases 
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of public works of the general account of the central government in years of good 
business conditions (to be sure, the public works expenditures of the general account 
also did not always decrease in times of good business conditions), namely in 
1966-1970 and during the bubble period. However, they did follow the decrease after 
the two large recessions of 1971 and 1974 as well as in 1994, 1996 and in 1997 (which 
was a recession year). This tendency is also reflected in the lower correlation of growth 
rates of shares in GNP of central and local government public works expenditure during 
times of good business conditions compared to recessions (see Table 7). 
This indicates that in times of scarce financial resources the local governments tend to 
follow the policy of the central government - this is also true for the times indicated as 
having had good business conditions after the recessions of 1971 and 1974 as well as 
the years 1994 and 1996 -, but they do spend more money for public works if there is 
enough money available (1966-1970 and during the bubble period). 
 
Table 7  Correlation of growth rates of shares in GNP of central and local government  
        public works expenditure by time period and state of business conditions 
 Central and local Central and prefectural  Central and municipal 
 all up down all up down  all up down 
1955-69 0.45 0.21 0.85  0.66 0.51 0.76 0.02 -0.14 0.99 
1970s 0.74 0.72 0.80  0.79 0.79 0.81 0.49 0.33 0.48 
1980s 0.54 0.66 -0.19  0.54 0.70 -0.48 0.49 0.53 0.27 
1990-98 0.72 -0.10 0.73  0.78 0.28 0.79 0.55 -0.59 0.56 
whole period 0.57 0.41 0.65  0.65 0.53 0.72 0.24 0.07 0.49 
1970-98 0.66 0.53 0.68  0.68 0.53 0.75 0.51 0.34 0.49 
Note: all - all years of period, up - years of upswing, down - years of downturn. 
 
The total of local government revenues, being the financing side of the expenditures, 
behaved as the total of local government expenditures. When looking at the different 
types of revenues, no clear cyclical behaviour was observed for local government tax 
 12
revenues and revenues from the Local Allocation Tax, which is a kind of general 
subsidy for fiscal equalisation (see part 5.2). Subsidies from the central government to 
local governments were inceased in all recessions except the smaller ones of the 1980s, 
while no clear cyclical behaviour is observable for times of good business conditions.  
The revenue contributing most to the parallel countercyclical movement of central and 
local government expenditures is borrowing. Since the first issue of central government 
bonds after the end of the occupation in 1965, the borrowing of the general account and 
the local governments (with only some very minor exceptions) showed a similar 
cyclical behaviour. Only the magnitude of general account borrowing was greater, 
especially between 1966-68 and 1976-86. This is observable for both the flow of 
borrowing in the budgets and for the change of stock values of outstanding debt (see 
figures 1 and 10). Interestingly, local government borrowing followed the central 
government in the 1990s even more strongly than in the second half of the 1970s. 
 
Figure 1  Central and local government borrowing in Japan 
Source: Somucho Tokeikyoku, several years. 
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5 The institutional setting. Why have local governments been participating in the  
 stabilisation policy of the central government?  
We now try to explain the observed correlation by focusing on the fiscal mechanism 
involved. At the margin, expenditure decisions of governments depend on the 
availability of resources. Therefore, to explain the participation of local governments in 
the stabilisation policy of the central government, we have to look at the influence of 
the central government on the financing side, i.e. on the revenues of local governments. 
The major components of local government revenue in Japan are own tax revenues, 
revenues from the local allocation tax as a general subsidy for fiscal equalisation, 
designated subsidies from the central government and local bonds. As depicted in figure 
2, a large proportion of these revenues comes from the central government. Not all of 
them  are  conditioned  in  their  use,  but  even  then  there  may  be  other  channels  of  central 
 
Figure 2 Revenues of Local Governments in Japan from Central Government Soucrces 
(Initial Budgets fiscal year 2000/2001; Trillions of Yen) 
 
Revenue sources from central government  Local Government Revenues  88.9 
 
 
       Tax revenues, fees      36.5 
    
 Central Government Budgets  Subsidies 13.0  Subsidies by central 
 (General and Special Accounts)    Special exception grants 0.9 government budgets    13.0 
       Special exception grants 0.9 
        
 Special Account for Local       Local Allocation Tax 21.4 Local allocation tax     21.4 
 Allocation and Transfer Tax       Local Transfer Tax 0.6  Local transfer tax       0.6 
 Local Transfer Tax             
 
 Fiscal Investment and  4.7   Local government 
 Loan Programme      borrowing               11.1 
 
 Japan Finance Corporation     0.7   Other                    5.2 
 for Municipal Enterprises                 
 
Notes:  
     subsidies   loans/investment 
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government influence. We discuss this in more detail on the following pages. 
 
5.1 Central government influence on local taxation 
Local governments are entirely free to use revenues from local taxes for any purpose 
they wish. Still, there are strong possibilities of central government influence even on 
local taxation (Reed 1979: 311, Ishi 1989: 242): 
   1) The major taxes a local government may impose are determined by central  
     government law. 
   2) The tax rates are limited to a close range by central government regulation. 
Local governments could impose additional taxes, but until March 2000 they had to 
seek the approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to levy such an additional tax 
(Ishi 1989: 244). In fiscal year 1998 altogether four types of such taxes, namely  
nuclear fuel tax (introduced by thirteen prefectures), crude oil price regulation tax (in 
one prefecture), gravel extraction tax (in five municipalities) and a villa property tax (in 
one municipality) were used by local governments, but the revenue from such taxes 
accounted for only 0.06% of total tax revenues of local governments in 1998. From 
April 2000, this approval system changed to a "consultation system", simplifying the 
approval procedures. The consent of the central government is still required, but a 
Dispute Settlement Committee (Kuni Chihou Keisou Shori Iinkai) has been established. 
Time will tell how much will change in reality. 
In contrast to the traditional major tax revenues of the general account of the central 
government (income tax and corporation tax), the major tax revenues of local 
governments (such as the prefectural and municipal inhabitants taxes, property, tobacco 
and automobile taxes) do not show as much variation in the business cycle. The 
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assignment of those taxes as the major revenues of local government itself has 
contributed to the relative cyclical stability of local, especially municipal, tax revenues. 
There have been reductions in local taxes, e.g. of inhabitants taxes in 1994, 1995 and 
1999. The major tax cuts within the fiscal stimulation packages of the central 
government, however, have usually involved central government taxes (income tax and 
corporation tax) to a larger extent than local taxes. This, in turn, had consequences for 
the Local Allocation Tax, for which these national taxes serve as a major source of 
revenue. 
 
5.2 The design of the Local Allocation Tax  
The Local Allocation Tax, the largest portion in the flow of funds from the central 
government to local governments, is a means of fiscal equalisation. It takes the form of 
transfers from central to local governments according to a certain formula. Its objective 
is to balance the fiscal capacity between the different regions and to guarantee a 
standard level of public services all over the country. These revenues are not earmarked 
and the local governments are free in their use, but the central government (MHA) can 
reward local governments which follow central government policies, by changing the 
formula accordingly. Thus the formula itself reflects the objectives of the central 
government. 
The major part of the local allocation tax (94% of the total5), the regular allocation tax 
(RAT), is calculated for each local entity according to the following formula: 
RAT = Standard Financial Demand (SFD) – Standard Financial Revenue (SFR) 
                                                        
5 The remaining six per cent are transferred to local governments as the special allocation tax. 
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with: SFD = amount of measuring units for service item x unit cost x adjust. coefficient 
and: SFR = ! x standard tax revenues of local entity + revenues from local transfer tax 
    where: !=0.8 for prefectures and !=0.75 for cities, towns and villages  
The standard financial demand is the total “standard expenditure” of a local government 
necessary for fulfilling its functions, such as fire protection, police and education. The 
unit of measurement usually is local population, length and area of roads or similar units. 
Unit costs for public services are determined each year by the Local Finance Bureau of 
the MHA, taking into account price changes and changes in the demand for services. 
The adjustment coefficients are used in order to reflect the differences in administrative 
costs among the local governments and depend on population density, climate etc.  
The standard financial revenue reflects the fiscal capacity of local governments and is 
calculated on the basis of the estimated amount of revenues from local taxes (assuming 
the “standard” tax rate which is set by the central government) and revenue from the 
local transfer tax. Thus the amount of the standard financial revenues does not depend 
on the actual tax rate set by the local government (within the range allowed by the 
central government). While the revenue from the local transfer tax is counted in full, 
only 80% (prefectures) and 75% (municipalities) of the tax revenues is counted in order 
to leave some incentive for local governments to increase their tax basis. 
Based on this calculation, the difference between standard financial demand and 
standard financial revenue does not necessarily have to be equivalent to 94% of the tax 
revenues reserved for the LAT. Therefore, if the difference is minor, an adjustment is 
made by multiplying the standard financial demand by an adjustment factor.  
If, however, the deficit is more severe, other steps have to be taken. In the 1950s and the 
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1960s, the share of the LAT in the three taxes (income tax, corporation tax and liquor 
tax) was raised several times (for details see table 8). In the twenty years between 1967 
and 1987, however, despite demands for further rises from the side of the MHA, the 
central government did not raise the share. This was mainly due to the opposition from 
the MOF, which preferred temporary measures to raising the share of the LAT in these 
taxes. Only with the introduction of the consumption tax in 1988 and again in recent 
years, further tax revenues were allocated to the LAT. 
 
Table 8  Changes of the share allocated to the Local Allocation Tax in the tax revenues  
        from income, corporation and liquor tax 
Year Change of share Reason 
1956 22.0 -> 25.0 insufficient revenue 
1957 25.0 -> 26.0 compensation for a tax cut by the central government 
1958 26.0 -> 27.5 repayment of local government bonds, etc. 
1959 27.5 -> 28.5 compensation for a tax cut by the central government 
1962 28.5 -> 28.9 Introduction of a pension scheme for local public servants, etc. 
1965 28.9 -> 29.5 compensation for a tax cut by the central government 
1966 295 -> 32.0 compensation for a tax cut by the central government 
1988 In addition: 24% of 4/5 of 
consumption tax and 
25 % of tobacco tax  
for mid-term consolidation of local government finance  
1997 Share in consumption tax 
raised to 29.5% of 4/5 
 
1999 Share in corporation tax 
raised to 32.5% 
compensation for a tax cut by the central government 
2000 Share in corporation tax 
raised to 35.8% 
compensation for a tax cut by the central government 
Source: MHA 1999: 336, MHA 2000: 57-62 
 
After 1966, instead of raising the share of the LAT in tax revenues, a policy of covering 
the deficit through additional borrowing by local governments and through borrowing 
by the Special Account for Local Allocation and Local Transfer Tax was taken. Figure 3 
shows the scope of the deficit and the importance of the major ways it was covered. 
This policy was combined with promising central government support for the 
repayment. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the central government took on itself the 
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Figure 3  Major ways of covering the deficit of the Local Finance Programme 
Source: MHA (2000): 84-85 
 
responsibility for covering about 50 per cent of the borrowing from the Special Account 
for Local Allocation and Local Transfer Tax. At the end of FY 1983, the outstanding 
borrowing amounted to more than 10.5 trillion Yen. In 1984, it was decided to stop new 
borrowing from the special account and in the same year the central government repaid 
its part of the debt to the Trust Fund Bureau. Thanks to the bubble period, nearly the 
whole outstanding debt of the special account was repaid by 1991. However, after the 
burst of the bubble, borrowing from the special account was started once again and at 
the end of FY 1998 the outstanding debt was higher when compared to GNP than at the 
earlier peak in FY 1983 (see figure 4). While from 1992 to 1995 the responsibility for 
the borrowing was solely with the local governments, in the years 1996 to 1998, the 
central government too accepted the repayment responsibility for slightly less than a 
third of the new borrowings.  
Another step taken by the central government with regard to tight revenues of the local 
governments was to provide incentives to increase local borrowing for certain purposes. 
For instance, payments necessary for repaying local debt and interest were included in 
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Figure 4   Outstanding borrowing from the Special Account for Local Allocation and Local 
          Transfer Tax 
Source: MOF (2000) 
 
calculating standard financial demand. This will be dealt with below in some more 
detail. 
This policy resulted in a growing share of debt service in standard financial demand 
between 1975 and 1985 and – after a fall during the bubble period – once again in the 
1990s. The share in the total of standard financial demand has increased to 5.7% by 
1998. Through the mechanism of calculating standard financial demand, it is also 
possible for the central government to change long-term incentives for local 
governments. A good example is changes in calculating standard expenses necessary for 
public works in the 1950s and 1960s (for details see Imai 1993: 69-71), which together 
with a general policy promoting public investment led to an increase of the weight of 
investment expenditures in the standard expenses from 6.9% in 1955 to 20.1% in 1965. 
The inclusion of debt service and public works expenditures in standard financial 
demand and the existence of a number of adjustment factors have led to a situation 
where the LAT is not only often redistributing too much (see also OECD 1999a:127 and 
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Hanai/Tajika/Yui 2000), but is also often quite unrelated to per capita tax revenues, 
depending on whether local governments are preferred by adjustment factors (which 
may well be justified in many cases) or follow the incentives of the LAT. Figure 5 
demonstrates that the differences in the per capita amount of LAT that the prefectures 
receive depends more on the reimbursement for construction expenditures through the 
LAT than on the fiscal capacity of a prefecture. 
 
5.3 Designated subsidies from the central government 
Designated subsidies from the central government budgets (kokko shishutsu kin) are the 
second largest item of funds flowing from the central government to local governments. 
There are several kinds of designated subsidies, but they are all earmarked and can be 
used only for a certain well defined purpose. Although previous research by political 
scientists has shown that the influence of designated subsidies on the behaviour of the 
local governments may not be that high, we argue that the central government does 
possess the means to influence this item, either directly – for items subject to its 
discretion – or indirectly by changing rules on when subsidies are to be granted.  
As we have seen, even so-called non-subsidised public works are often de facto 
subsidised. In the example featured in figure 6, it is sufficient for the local entity to 
provide 10% of own funds of the total necessary expenditure at the time the project is 
started, provided it is receiving funds from the LAT (on the prefectural level, only 
Tokyo is not receiving funds from the LAT). 15% come from the LAT and 75% are 
financed by local government borrowing, 30% to 55%, depending on the financial 
situation of the local entity concerned, being covered by the LAT in later years. For FY 
1996/97 even the 15% to be covered by the LAT of the current year was replaced by  
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Figure 5  Redistribution effects of the Local Allocation Tax (LAT) in fiscal year 1997 
 
Source: Somucho Tokeikyoku 1998, 2000, own calculations. 
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borrowing, later to be reimbursed by LAT.  
Figure 6  Financing a "furusatozukuri"-project 
        local government borrowing   75%                 local government revenues 
       (measures by LAT in later years: 30% to 55%)                 15% refunded    10% 
                by current LAT 
Source: Chiho zaisei seido kenkyu kyokai (1996): 96 
 
Due to the leverage effect, even projects with low expected benefits are implemented. It 
is rational for a local government to start projects where the expected benefit is larger 
than its own contribution to covering the costs. Obviously, apart from the aspect of 
cyclicality discussed before, such a situation has a very negative effect on the efficiency 
of resource allocation.6 
Therefore, a better link between costs and benefits would be desirable on allocative 
grounds. This could be achieved by giving the local governments a larger percentage of 
the tax revenues, and instead reducing the subsidies through the LAT. We do not deny 
that there is a need for some kind of fiscal equalisation, but as could be seen in figure 5, 
the system possibly redistributes too much and too unrelated to the financial capacity of 
local governments, thus also reducing incentives to raise more own tax revenues. 
                                                        
6 Multiplier effects of public works may have also decreased in the last decades because of this 
factor. While some economists doubt this decrease, there is still the conspicious emphasis on public 
works in rural areas. Studies (e.g. by Yoshino/Nakata/Nakahigashi 2000) have shown that a 
redirection of public works away from rural to urban areas would raise the multiplier.  
However, it remains to be seen whether the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has its 
electorate mainly in rural areas, will be willing to change this structure. This is especially doubtful 
since the electoral system, though to a lesser extent than before the electoral reform, favours rural 
areas, giving votes from rural areas a higher weight than votes from urban areas. 
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5.4 Central government influence on local government borrowing 
Concerning local government borrowing, there is a great deal of central government 
influence as well. The Local Finance Law (Article 5) allows the issue of local 
government bonds only for the financing of investment expenditure (public works) and 
for the financing of public enterprises. Moreover, it was obligatory for local 
governments to receive the approval for issuing local government bonds: for the 
prefectures, from the MHA, for municipalities, from the prefectural governor. The 
permission to issue bonds is enacted on the basis of general guidelines, not on a case by 
case basis. However, as we will see below, the guidelines themselves are subject to 
government discretion.  
There are several methods enabling local governments to increase borrowing during 
recessions. One is deliberately changing the share of certain expenditures that can be 
refinanced by local bond issues (or the inclusion of new items). This is illustrated in 
figure 7 with respect to some typical subsidised general local public works expenditures. 
This policy tool was used in 1973, 1976-79, 1983-84, 1987 and after 1994. As Imai 
(1993:125) rightly pointed out, it is questionable whether this kind of policy has 
anything to do with future benefits from the investments or with the norm of healthy 
public finance. Rather, the general financial situation of local governments seems to 
have been decisive. 
A second mechanism is to allow deficit borrowing in times of recessions. Many 
different denominations have been made use of - in Figure 8 they were all added up 
under the heading "deficit measure borrowing". 
A third method is to allow the issuing of supplementary budget bonds. The major  
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Figure 7  Allowed refinancing of local expenditures through borrowing 
Source: Chihosai Seido Kenkyukai, several years  
 
Figure 8  Increase in outstanding local government deficit measure borrowing (share of GNP) 
Source: Somucho Tokeikyoku, several years, estimate by the authors 
 
technique used is revising the Local Finance Programme7 during the fiscal year, further 
public works expenditures to be financed by additional local government bonds.  
A fourth method is to include expenditures necessary for repaying bonds and for the 
                                                        
7 The Local Finance Programme is drawn up by the MHA every year. It is the official estimate of  
 revenues and expenditures of local governments and is negotiated with the MOF and the Cabinet. 
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payment of interest in the calculation of standard expenditures. For our purposes, it is 
interesting to present examples where there have been such changes in unit costs and 
adjustment coefficients. 
As of FY 1995, such examples are adjustment coefficients for "supplementary budget 
bonds" (table 9), unit costs for "revenue ensuring bonds" (table 10), "shortfall of local 
tax revenues compensation bonds" (issued from 1978 until 1988, prefectures 80%, 
municipalities 75%), "temporary fiscal special exemption bonds" (issued 1993 - 1995, 
100% for both prefectures and municipalities), and "tax cut compensation bonds" 
(issued 1994, 100%). 
 
Table 9  Adjustment coefficients for "supplementary budget bonds" (1975-1994) 
Year Prefectures Municipalities 
1975 59% 42% 
1976 65% 38% 
1977 68% 48% 
1978 69% 54% 
1979-1985 - - 
1986 40% 33% 
1987 78% 78% 
1988-1991 - - 
1992-1994 80% 80% 
Source: Kusu 1996: 711 
 
Table 10  Unit costs for "revenue ensuring bonds" 
 A issued for compul- 
  sory education, etc. 
B issued for public works  
 for rivers and ports (1994  
 for general public works) 
C issued for Expen- 
 diture apart from  
 A and B 
D Adjustment  
  bonds 
1978-1981 100% 80% 80%  
     
1983-1988  80% 20% 1985  65,7% 
    1986  87,4% 
    1987  75,2% 
    1988  92,2% 
1994-1995  80% 20%  
Source: Kusu 1996: 708 
 
On a more general level, figure 9 shows how important debt service in the standard 
financial demand is. In 1998, more than half a per cent of GNP was paid for this 
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purpose within the LAT, and the figure has risen since. 
 
Figure 9  Debt service within standard financial demand 
Source: MHA, several years, copies of the statistics were kindly provided by Dr. Takero Doi. 
 
Yet another method is to take care of interest costs for local borrowing. Government 
funds, most importantly borrowing from the Trust Fund Bureau of the Ministry of 
Finance (TFB), have for a long time been the major source of local government 
borrowing. In the 1970s and the 1990s, however, a major part of new local borrowing 
was financed by private financial institutions such as commercial banks and security 
companies. In the 1970s, there was the problem that the interest rate of the private 
financial institutions was much higher than that of the TFB. In order to stimulate local 
government borrowing in a situation of financial shortage, the central government – 
given limitations in the availability of central government funds for lending – promised 
to pay for the difference in the interest rates. In the 1990s, there was no such problem, 
sometimes the interest rate of the private banks was even lower. Nevertheless, steps to 
cut interest costs were taken. For instance, the TFB allowed earlier repayment of high 
interest-rate loans to local governments meeting certain conditions in fiscal year 1999 
(OECD 1999a: 104). 
Parallel to this policy, the central government tried to increase the share of (cheap) 
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Corporation for Municipal Enterprises (JFCME) were expanded to some items of the 
ordinary accounts of local governments. This type of financing is being continued (see 
figure 1). 
How successful the central government policies have been in influencing local 
borrowing can be seen when comparing the development of central and local 
government borrowing (see figure 1 and figure 10). 
 
Figure 10  Yearly increase of outstanding debt 
Source: Somucho Tokeikyoku, several years, MHA (2000), MOF (2000) 
 
All in all, the policy instruments used in interjurisdictional relations in Japan are not 
directly forcing local governments to cooperate with the central government, they do, 
however, provide strong incentives to do so and thus account for the patterns observed 
before. 
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6 Recent changes and reforms: Will local government continue to follow the  
 central government fiscal policy in a changed environment? 
As shown above, local governments in Japan have usually followed the central 
government in its fiscal policies. However, recently there have been well publicised 
concerns about the level the local government debt has reached, forcing them to rethink 
fiscal consolidation (see, for example, Tett 1998, Ikeya/Suzuki 2001) and to consider 
the introduction of new taxes. Moreover, government reform measures aimed at 
decentralisation could be expected to lead to a more procyclical movement of local 
government revenues and a reduced willingness of local governments to follow the 
central government policies. Will this lead to a situation where local governments will 
no longer follow the central government, or is the established "system" strong enough to 
ensure a continuation of past patterns? 
 
6.1. Alarmingly rising levels of local government indebtedness 
As is well known, the indebtedness of the Japanese government has become alarmingly 
high. Among the G7 countries, only Italy has a higher ratio of outstanding gross 
financial liabilities of general government as a percentage of GDP. Even more alarming 
is the speed at which the Japanese public debt is rising (6.0% of GDP in 1998). 
Indebtedness has reached very high levels not only on the central, but also on the local 
level (see table 11). 
One might suppose that for this reason local governments will hesitate to accumulate 
even more debt just to follow the policies of the central government. Indeed, there is 
ample anecdotical evidence for such a reluctance, which has sometimes even led to  
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Table 11  Central and local government finance: An international comparison of  
         important fiscal indicators of G7 countries 
  Gross financial 
liabilities 1) 
Financial 
balance 1) 
 Outstanding debt/tax revenues 
by level of government 
Country Year   Year total central state local 
Japan 1970  +1.7 1970 0.60 2) 0.49 2)  0.56 1.16 
Japan 1980  52.0 -4.4 1980 2.37 2) 2.68 2)  1.66 2.06 
Japan 1990  61.5 +2.9 1990 2.40 2) 2.82 2)  1.53 1.78 
Japan 1999 105.3 -7.0 1998 5.06 2) 6.27 2)  3.66 3.05 
Japan 1998  97.3 -6.0 1998 4.66 3) 5.22 3)  3.66 3.05 
US 1998  62.4 0.4 1997 2.08 3) 2.44 3)  0.97 1.90 
Germany 1998  63.3 -1.7 1998 1.63 3) 1.50 3)  2.04 1.63 
France 1998  64.9 -2.7 1997 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Italy 1998 118.2 -2.7 1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
UK 1998  56.4 0.2 1997 1.46 3) 1.35 3) n.a. 4.22 
Canada 1998  91.7 0.9 1995 3.83 3) 4.53 3)  3.45 1.94 
Note: 1) General government data, per cent of nominal GDP 
     2) Budgetary central government data (only general account) 
     3) Consolidated central government data 
Source: OECD 1999b, IMF, for outstanding debt and tax revenues in Japan Japanese data was used. 
 
open conflict between central and local governments (e.g. Tett 1998). However, 
interestingly and ironically, as we will show below, the lack of resources on the local 
government level actually strengthens most of the existing influence mechanisms of the 
central government on local government revenues and therefore does not weaken 
substantially the established system (see 7 and table 12). A general reduction of local 
government indebtedness, therefore, seems possible only if it is desired (deliberate 
consolidation) or, at least, tolerated (decentralisation) by the central government. 
 
6.2. New local government taxes 
As already mentioned, from April 2000 the approval system for the introduction of 
additional local taxes changed to a "consultation system", simplifying the approval 
procedures. Since the consent of the central government is still required, de facto it is 
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still an approval system. In practice, consequences will depend on the actual 
"consultation" procedures and the handling of disputes by the newly established Dispute 
Settlement Committee (Kuni Chihou Keisou Shori Iinkai). Therefore, it is still too early 
to assess the importance of this change. 
An important mechanism is to make use of a special provision of the corporate business 
tax in the Local Tax Law under which new taxes by a number of prefectures have been 
introduced, among them the well-publicised tax on banks of the Tokyo prefectural 
government. As from fiscal year 2000, Tokyo metropolitan government levies a 3 per 
cent tax on the gross operating profits of banks with assets of at least 5 trillion Yen. The 
revenue from this tax will be much larger and more stable than from the previously 
existing tax on banks. With an estimated annual revenue of 110 billion Yen it will be 
equivalent to about 2.7 per cent of Tokyo metropolitan government tax revenues or 
about 15.2 per cent of Tokyo's borrowing in fiscal year 1999. This new tax will not 
fundamentally change the fiscal situation of Tokyo, but it is much more than the FY 
1998 total of 0.06% share of non-standard taxes introduced by local governments in 
total local tax revenues (see 5.1). Osaka followed Tokyo with a similar tax and other 
prefectures also have plans for new taxes. 
 
6.3 Abolishment of the approval system for borrowing 
From April 2000, a consultation system instead of an approval system was also 
introduced for borrowing, but at least until the year 2005, which was originally 
envisaged for the consolidation of government finance by the frozen public finance 
structural reform law, the approval system will be continued. Under the new 
consultation system, a local entity will be able to borrow even without the consent of 
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the central government (or of the prefectural governor in the case of municipalities). 
However, a report by the governor or mayor about the planned borrowing to the relevant 
prefectural or municipal assembly is required in advance. 
Even after the abolishment of the approval system for local borrowing, there will still be 
mechanisms left for the central government to discriminate between borrowing for 
which the consent of the central government or of the governor was received and 
borrowing where this was not the case: 
1) Public funds can be lent only in cases where consent for the borrowing was  
  received. This may imply a difference in interest rates, because often the  
  interest rate of public funds is lower than that of private financial institutions.  
  This is not that much of a problem for the larger and financially healthier  
  prefectures, because they can borrow on the private capital markets at  
  reasonable interest rates. It is, however important for financially weak local  
  entities, since these would have to pay substantially higher interest rates or, in  
  extreme cases, would be unable to borrow at all.  
2) Only (redemption and interest) expenses for approved borrowing are included  
  in the Local Finance Programme. 
3) Only expenses for approved borrowing can be included in the LAT standard  
  financial demand. 
In addition, there will still be a number of general mechanisms of central government 
control over local government borrowing. Thus, in order to ensure the credibility of 
local government borrowing, in cases when the outstanding debt of a local entity is 
higher than a certain upper limit, further borrowing can only be done with the approval 
of the central government or the governor. Moreover, in case a local government has tax 
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rates for standard taxes below the standard rate, it will have to obtain the approval for 
borrowing for certain defined items (up to now borrowing for these items was 
forbidden). 
In this connection it is interesting to note that the lending by postal savings, postal life 
insurance and government pension funds to local governments will remain subject to a 
decision by the Diet. This is the only exlusion from the general abolishment of Diet 
approval for the investments and loans of these funds within the framework of the 
reform of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme (FILP), which came into force in 
April 2001. This indicates that the central government wants to keep control over this 
lending. 
 
7 Overall assessment of the effects of the system and of its changes 
As has been shown, there is a substantial number of mechanisms ensuring central 
government influence on local government revenues – both on the magnitude and – to a 
lesser extent – on the structure of local government expenditure. Table 12 presents an 
attempt to assess the importance of the various mechanisms discussed. During times of 
recession there is a number of mechanisms providing incentives and financial means for 
local governments to participate in countercyclical policy: supplementary budget/deficit 
borrowing, borrowing by the Special Account for Local Allocation and Local Transfer 
Tax as well as subsidies, discretionary increase and inclusion of new items that can be 
refinanced by local government borrowing, the inclusion of borrowing costs in the 
calculation of the Local Allocation Tax. Tax cuts reducing the financial burden on the 
private sector, but influencing local government revenues (mainly the LAT through 
central government income and enterprise taxes, but also local inhabitants taxes) are 
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Table 12  Influence mechanisms of the central government on local government  
         revenues and their effects on countercyclical policy - a synoptic view 
Mechanism Effect in times 
of bad business  
conditions  
Effect in times of  
favourable business  
conditions 
Change in  
mechanism 
Effect on me- 
chanism by  
rising   more 
debt    own 
level    taxes 
I Subsidy ++ + o e  w 
II Borrowing 
a approval system 
b refinancing coefficients 
c supplementary budget/ 
  deficit borrowing 
d lending by government 
  funds 
 
+ 
++ 
+++ 
 
+ 
 
+/o 
+/o 
o 
 
o/- 
from 2005 
w 
o/w 
o/w 
 
o 
 
u  w 
u  w 
u  w 
 
e  w 
III Local Allocation Tax 
a Borrowing by the  
 Special Account 
b inclusion of borrowing  
 costs 
c inclusion of other items 
 
 
+++ 
++ 
 
+ 
 
 
+++ 
o/- 
 
o/- 
 
 
o 
o 
 
o 
 
 
e  w 
e  w 
 
e  w 
IV Taxation 
a tax cuts (incl. LAT) 
b tax increases 
 
+++ 
o/- 
 
o/- 
+++ 
 
o/w 
o/w 
 
o  u 
o  u 
Notes: 
e - enforcing    w - weakening   u - unclear      o - no change 
+ - positive     - - negative      o - no effect / no substantial effect 
 
also used. During favourable business conditions, only a reduction of the borrowing    
through the special account and tax increases (including natural ones) seem well suited 
to achieve the goals of stabilisation and consolidation. All the other instruments become 
weak or ambiguous. Given the political problems when enforcing such tax increases, 
especially when they are explicit, this means that the mechanisms are much better suited 
for countercyclical policy in times of bad business conditions than in times of 
favourable business conditions. This can explain why the correlation between central 
and local government expenditure is lower during upswings than during downturns, as 
identified above (see table 6 and table 7).  
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The changes in the mechanisms weaken the established system, but not altogether. The 
weakening of the mechanisms is compensated to some extent through rising local 
government debt levels. These contribute to a shortage of funds at the local level. Thus, 
they strengthen the influence mechanisms of the central government which aim at 
control through the provision of funds. On the other hand, as already mentioned above, 
rising local government debt levels make local governments hesitant to accumulate even 
more debt just to follow stabilisation policies of the central government during 
recessions. Thus the effect of rising local government debt levels on the readiness of 
local governments to issue further debt for stabilisation purposes is unclear. 
Further decentralisation, shrinking debt levels and more own tax revenues of local 
governments may eventually lead to a more procyclical behaviour of local governments. 
For the time being, however, it is likely that local governments will follow a central 
government countercyclical policy in times of bad business conditions provided the 
subsidies for local governments will be continued - there is no free lunch. 
All in all, several mechanisms in the Japanese fiscal system make local governments 
follow the central government countercyclical policy, especially during recession 
periods. Recent, well-reported changes did not break up this system. While it is 
welcome from the viewpoint of stabilisation that local governments do not act 
procyclically, there are considerable negative side-effects of an allocation through the 
large subsidies from central to local governments. Due to the distorted incentive 
structures for utilising such strategies, partly inefficient public works expenditures have 
become unavoidable. 
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8 Summary 
In this paper we have looked into whether local governments in Japan, which account 
for a large proportion of government expenditure, follow the countercyclical policy of 
the central government. Relevant mechanisms and recent changes were also explored. 
This allowed us to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in Japan, on 
the degree of local autonomy and on the likelihood of (negative) side-effects on 
resource allocation. 
While the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism would lead one to expect a 
procyclical behaviour of local governments, we observe a countercyclical development. 
Local governments do participate in the fiscal policy of the central government. This 
suggests that the central government can indeed exert significant influence on the 
activities of local governments. 
The major mechanism for the participation of Japan's local governments in the central 
government's fiscal policy is making available financial means in times of recession at 
relatively low cost for the local governments. The major tools used are: 
1) The assignment of tax revenues to the local level which are cyclically  
  relatively stable during the business cycle. 
2) The provision of additional financial means for the system of fiscal  
  equalisation in times of financial shortage. 
3) The increase of central government subsidies in times of recession. 
4) Controlling and influencing local borrowing, especially supporting  
  additional borrowing in recessions. 
These mechanisms are more effective in bad than in favourable business conditions, and 
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such a behaviour of local governments can indeed be shown.  
Even though there were several improvements in the position of local governments 
–increased share in total tax revenues over time, rising amount of LAT, introduction of 
consultation systems for the introduction of new taxes and for local government 
borrowing that are less rigid than the systems used before – the central government 
retained important control mechanisms: 
1) The mechanism of incentives through the design of the LAT and the  
  possibility of borrowing from the special account 
2) Even though there will be a new consultation system for local government  
  borrowing instead of the old approval system, important tools in this area 
  are left, among them parliamentary control over the lending by government  
  funds, including postal savings, postal life insurance and government  
  pension funds, to local governments 
3) The consultation system for the introduction of new local taxes even needs  
  agreement from the MHA. 
While the system supports the fiscal goal of stabilisation – we do not discuss whether 
Keynesian-type countercyclical fiscal policy actually does work – it has significant 
negative effects on allocation and on interregional redistribution. Moreover, given the 
current level of influence of the central government on local government finance, one 
can hardly speak of a well developed fiscal decentralisation in Japan. Further 
decentralisation would probably improve the allocation of resources of local 
governments remarkably, but it would also make local governments less willing to 
follow the stabilisation policy of the central government.  
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